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Neo-Quineanism and the method of metaphysics
Here is an example of a metaphysical dispute in contemporary analytic philosophy: there are presentists, who say that only the present exists and the past and the future do not, and there are eternalists, who say that the past, present and future all exist. Questions can arise about whether this dispute is substantive. Could it…
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Anti-realism and the decline of truth
It’s by now a familiar argument: thinkers of what might be called a ‘relativist’, ‘postmodern’ or ‘anti-realist’ bent get accused of having corrupted science and society, leading to naked ideology in the universities and a blatant disregard for truth in the public sphere. While few will believe that Trump and his followers have deeply studied…
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Locating value
Do things have intrinsic value? If there are things out there that have intrinsic value, doesn’t that mean that we are lucky to be living in a world that contains such things? Could those same things also exist without the value built into them? How do we detect the value in things? All of these…
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The books (2021)
In 2019, I read 27 books. In 2020, I decided to challenge myself and read at least 50 books; which I managed to do, in fact reading as many as 63. But one thing I noticed was a perverse desire to read short books, since short books would get me to my goal faster. To…
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On knowledge and belief
We are finite knowers. This is a platitude. But it easy to lose sight of what the platitude means. Part of what it means is that we do not know everything; that the amount of things we know is finite — perhaps in the mathematical sense of the term, but certainly, and more importantly, in…
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Kantian and Cartesian scepticism
I recently wrote about the unity of Kant’s cognitive powers. Just now I was reading an article by Arata Hamawaki, “Cartesian Skepticism, Kantian Skepticism, and Two Conceptions of Self-consciousness”, published in The Logical Alien: Conant and his Critics, edited by Sofia Miguens. Hamawaki writes something that may seem to contradict the claims that I made…
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On the Unity of Kant’s Many Cognitive Powers
Recently somebody on Twitter (using the handle @robotsneedpoems) complained to me about the Critique of Pure Reason: It’s crazy to me how confident K[ant] is in his ability to discern discrete cognitive faculties just by reasoning them out. He keeps plowing ahead, constructing a mind-numbingly complex account out of more or less thin air. I…
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On the Claim that Properties are Sets
David Lewis, in his 1986 book On the Plurality of Worlds, argues that properties are sets. Any property should be taken as “the set of all its instances — all of them, this- and other-worldly alike. Thus the property of being a donkey comes out as the set of all donkeys, the donkeys of other…
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On the end of analytic philosophy
In his blog post ‘The End of Analytic Philosophy’, Liam Bright paints a starkly pessimistic — almost Spenglerian — view of the current state of what we still call analytic philosophy. I choose that last phrase with care. Once there may have been a coherent conception of philosophy as the discipline whose task it is…
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The 50 book challenge
In 2019, I read 27 books. But I wanted to read more. I wanted to find a way to motivate myself to pick up a book in the evening, rather than spend time on my phone, or the internet, or playing a computer game, or doing who knows what. I love reading books. But it’s…